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Using the approach known as ‘Economics of Scientific Knowledge’, this paper 
defends the view of scientific norms as the result of a ‘social contract’, i.e., as an 
equilibrium in the (second order) game of selecting the norms under which to 
proceed to play the (first order) game of scientific research and publication. A 
categorisation of the relevant types of scientific norms is offered, as well as a 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Science is an essentially collaborative enterprise: it is not only that most 
research projects have unavoidably to be conducted in teams, but that 
all research is necessarily based on results and techniques developed by 
other researchers. Though it is true that criticising previous ideas is very 
important for furthering our knowledge of the world, we must not forget 
that for every idea one scientists criticises during her research, she needs 
to use in a non-critical (she has to ‘take for granted’) way hundreds of 
other ideas. Of course these ‘presuppositions’ have nothing that 
intrinsically prevents us from submitting them to thorough criticism on 
their turn, but in science (as in life) we cannot put between brackets 
everything at the same time. So, scientist have to trust many of the 
results provided by other colleagues, and this trust is, of course, an 
(epistemic) variety of cooperation. Having said that, we cannot forget, 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgments: Financial support from Spanish Government’s research project 
FFI2011-23267 is acknowledged. 
 




however, that scientific research is also a field of intense and perpetual 
competition: research is organised around problems, and scientists 
struggle for being the first in solving these. There is nothing particularly 
strange in cooperation and competition coexisting within a social 
institution like science: most, if not all, aspects of social life consist in 
some mix of these two things, from markets to sports, from religion to 
politics, from arts to personal relations. In general, the social mechanism 
that guarantees a peaceful coexistence of competition and cooperation is 
simply norms. Social norms state what is compulsory or forbidden to do 
in some circumstances, which means what ways of competing are 
legitimate and which are not, what ways of cooperating are mandatory 
and which ones are excluded (yes, many forms of cooperation are –even 
justly– forbidden; think, for example, of antitrust law). 
But norms are themselves a space for cooperation and competition: 
establishing some norms within a social realm demands at least the 
collective agreement (if not the active involvement) of most of the 
people to which the norms will be applied, and this agreement is of 
course a form of cooperation; but different individuals or groups may 
have different preferences about what are the best possible norms, and 
the discussions and negotiations leading to the final agreement will also 
be a chance for strategic competition. Game theory is the natural formal 
instrument to examine this type of collective interactions, in which the 
final point, the agreement, results from the combination of different and 
conflicting interests in an ‘equilibrium’ (technically, a Nash 
equilibrium), i.e., a situation in which no one can improve what she is 
obtaining from it if the others don’t change what they are doing, a 
situation in which there is no space for unilateral improvement. Applied 
to the case of the establishment of social norms, game theory obviously 
suggest to take a contractarian approach to the nature of these, and this 
is the spirit of my previous works on the nature and virtues of scientific 
norms (see, e.g., Zamora Bonilla, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2013). Taking into 
account the nature of this journal issue, I will devote this paper not to 
the analysis of specific norms, nor to their epistemic properties, but to 
the idea of scientific norms as a kind of ‘social contract’ (sect. 3), and to 
the reasons that lead individual scientist to respect those norms to the 
extent they do (sect. 4). Before that, I will make a short introduction to 
the ‘economics of scientific knowledge’ (sect. 2), to which the approach 
presented here will most naturally belong. 
 




2. The Economics if Scientific Knowledge 
 
The term ‘economics of scientific knowledge’ (ESK) was coined as a 
reaction to the field known from the seventies as ‘sociology of scientific 
knowledge’. The latter had been defined by the members of the so called 
‘Strong Programme’ in contraposition to the classical notion of a 
‘sociology of science’, having in mind a distinction between the 
sociological explanation of the institutional, political and cultural 
aspects of science, on the one hand, and a sociological explanation of the 
cognitive aspects of science, on the other hand. ‘Sociology of science’ 
would be devoted to the ‘external’ (non epistemic) aspects of science, 
whereas ‘sociology of scientific knowledge’ would study the ‘internal’ 
content of science, i.e., why certain theories, facts or paradigms are 
accepted or rejected. Sociologists in the ‘Strong Programme’ derived 
some radically relativist conclusions from this starting point, in 
opposition to most traditional views about scientific knowledge. An 
open question was, hence, whether the application of analytical 
instruments drawn from the economist’s toolkit to the understanding of 
the process of knowledge generation, i.e., the view of scientists as agents 
within an economic model, would support the relativist claims of radical 
sociologists or, on the contrary, would serve to ‘save’ the intuitive 
character of scientific knowledge as a paradigm of ‘objectivity’. As we 
shall see, most contributions to ESK fall under the second of these 
options. 
Obviously, in retrospect we can realize that many antecedent works 
can be identified under the ESK label, though the main production of 
papers and books on the topic has been made in the last two decades. 
One possible way of classifying all these works is according to the type of 
economic models or metaphors they attempt to apply to the study of the 
creation of scientific knowledge. From this point of view, we can 
distinguish, first, formal (or ‘mathematical’) from non-formal (or 
‘institutional’) approaches.  
One of the most important contributions in the first group is Philip 
Kitcher’s paper entitled “The Division of Cognitive Labour” (1990), in 
which he develops a set of models based on the assumption of 
interacting rational self-interested scientists.  According to Kitcher 
(1993, p. 303), the aim of his models is “to identify the properties of 
epistemically well-designed social systems, that is, to specify the 




conditions under which a group of individuals, operating according to 
various rules for modifying their individual practices, succeed, through 
their interactions, in generating a progressive sequence of consensus 
practices”. Other interesting mathematical models of scientific activity 
that have been developed during the last decades refer to the ‘game’ 
between researchers and journal editors, or the way in which researchers 
try to change the subjective probabilities of their colleagues), or about 
the decision whether to replicate another resarcher’s experiments, or on 
the decision of accepting a more ‘popular’ theory or defending a more 
‘heterodox’ one, on the basis of the different information about both 
theories each individual scientist has. The last two cases show the 
possible existence of more than one equilibrium in the ‘cognitive state’ 
of the scientific community, what can lead to phenomena of path-
dependence, inefficiency, and sudden ‘revolutions’. Some more recent 
contributions have analysed the properties of the priority rule, the 
choice of methodological rules, and the negotiation about the 
interpretation of empirical findings. In the last times, due surely to the 
availability of more powerful software, it has become relatively common 
the use of simulation models to study Kitcherian ‘division of epistemic 
labour’ problems, especially in cases of great complexity. Many of these 
papers are grounded on the simulation models of Reiner Hegselmann 
and Ulrich Krause, which in turn are inspired by the work of Keith 
Lehrer and Carl Wagner on ‘rational’ belief aggregation.2 
 
 
3. The Scientific Method as a Social Contract  
 
Though there is obviously a big amount of literature on the social 
structure of science, and on the application of economic or game-
theoretic categories to its study, I think that the academic analysis of 
the social structure of science and of the relations between science and 
society from a contractarian point of view is still a project for the future, 
and this paper attempts to be an invitation for the development of such 
a project. I shall try to apply the contractarian view to a particular 
aspect of the ‘governance of science’ which has often been considered as 
totally alien to the introduction of ‘sociological’ or ‘political’ 
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considerations: i.e., that set of procedures usually referred to under the 
rubric of ‘scientific methodology’.  
Our starting point would be to assume that scientists are players in a 
competitive game whose goal is the attainment of a particular kind of 
social and epistemic reward: being acknowledged as the author of an 
important discovery. The basic idea is to consider that this game is 
played according to a system of rules or norms that are not absolutely 
imposed by a transcendental logic or something of the like, nor by 
another external authority, but that can be negotiated by the very same 
players of the game (i.e., the researchers). The question is, hence, the 
following: if you were a scientists playing that game, i.e., pursuing 
recognition for discoveries, ‘against’ other scientists attempting to do 
exactly the same, what scientific norms would you like the game were 
played by? 
Firstly, let’s see what kinds of norms can be expected to arise in a 
negotiation among ‘recognition-seeking’ researchers. It seems that three 
types of them are needed, at least: 
1) Inferential norms: these tell that, if a researcher has accepted 
certain propositions, and if another proposition stands in certain 
specified relation with the former ones, then that researcher will be 
forced to accept also the later proposition. For example, norms of this 
type will establish when can we take a hypothesis as ‘well supported 
enough’ to make its acceptance compulsory. These rules are useful for a 
‘recognition-seeking’ researcher because they indicate what statements 
you have to persuade your colleagues about, before attaining the public 
acceptance of your hypothesis. 
2) Observational norms: in order to prevent the strategic denial to 
accept any statement that can ‘trigger’ the undesired acceptance of a 
rival’s theory through the rules of the first type, it is necessary that the 
commitment about some kinds of propositions is compulsory for reasons 
different from the previous acceptance of other statements. Typically, 
observations and experiments (or specific parts of them) are the natural 
locus of this type of norms, though probably nor the only one. 
3) Distributional norms: these norms govern the allocation of the 
power to control the resources needed for making research and 
communicating its results. Obviously, this power is interesting for 
scientists not only because it increases the probability of getting their 
theories accepted, but also because many other ‘private benefits’ accrue 




to them together with that power (I admit that these rules are less 
appropriately called ‘methodological’). 
Secondly, it is perhaps more important to notice some properties that 
any ‘reasonable’ system of rules must have. These properties are 
grounded on the very nature of the negotiation process through which 
the rules are established: 
1) Norms are usually chosen ‘under the veil of ignorance’ (to use a 
Rawlsian expression). It is certainly possible that accepting a norm may 
be interesting for you on a particular occasion because that norm 
‘supports’ the theory you are proposing; but committing to a norm today 
forces you to be committed to it also in the future, and perhaps the same 
rule makes it that the facts discovered tomorrow support some of your 
rivals’ theories more than yours. In general, it is very difficult for you to 
predict exactly what theories or hypotheses will you be proposing in the 
future, and what will its connection be with the accepted facts. So, as 
long as methodological rules operate as real (and more or less durable) 
commitments, it is not necessarily a wise strategy to ‘vote’ for the rules 
that happen to favour your ‘current’ theory. 
2) As long as the decision of belonging to a scientific community or 
exiting and constituting a different one is open for researchers, it makes 
no sense to talk about ‘imposing’ a rule. A norm is a norm within a 
scientific discipline because it is better for everyone of its members to adopt 
it as long as it is adopted by the other members. So, a rule will only be 
established if it promotes reasonably well the prospects for recognition 
of most of the members of the discipline (for, if there is another rule they 
think it were more beneficial for them, they could simply impose it). 
This does not entail that everyone will have exactly the same 
probability of success, for scientists less talented and poorly equipped 
will be content with a lesser probability of success than their more 
fortunate colleagues. 
3) The two previous properties entail that scientific norms will tend 
to be impartial, because they must offer a fair opportunity to rival 
approaches and theories. If a particular approach is seen as ‘promising’ 
by the members of a scientific discipline, and some existing norms tend 
to diminish the chances of success of those following that approach, 
researchers will be interested in negotiating a change in the norms and 
will begin to explore the new ideas according to the new rules. On the 
other hand, it is also true that norms may have some ‘inertia’, and this 
can slow down the negotiation process. 
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4) In many cases, the real effects of a norm on the prospects of 
getting public recognition will be so uncertain, that scientists will tend 
to be indifferent between several alternative rules as long as only 
recognition is considered. Let consider, for example, a norm indicating 
that ‘ceteris paribus, the theories with a higher predictive success have to 
be preferred’, and contrast it with alternative norms, as ‘ceteris paribus, 
the theories with a lower predictive success have to be preferred’, or 
‘ceteris paribus, the theories which have been formulated in Latin verses 
have to be preferred’. Imagine now that you could negotiate with your 
colleagues which of these three rules to adopt. It is by no means clear 
which one of the three maximises the probability of your winning a game 
of research; perhaps you are much better at Latin than the rest, but in 
this case it is just this differential ability what will make your 
competitors abstain from accepting a norm so clearly benefiting you. In 
any case, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ground your decision about 
which norm to accept on an estimation of your probability of success. 
What other criteria will you employ, then? It seems to be a benevolent 
assumption that, ceteris paribus, researchers will prefer methodological 
norms which are consistent with the maximisation of the epistemic value 
of the theories which happen to win in the game of persuasion. After all, 
why would they have chosen a scientific career as a means of getting 
public recognition, instead of other kinds of activities, as pop music, 
sports, or politics, if they did not worry at all about the attainment of 
‘knowledge’? 
A last important point in connection with this is that, although the 
contractarian approach to scientific norms leaves some space to the 
influence of epistemic factors in the choice of the rules (and hence in the 
justification of scientific knowledge), we cannot interpret this result as a 
return of the classical view of epistemologists as deciding a priori how 
the pursuit of knowledge has to be. Because it is essential to recall that, 
even if epistemic values enter into the negotiation of scientific norms, 
this values are those of the researchers who are taking part in it, not those 
of the philosopher or the ‘science student’ who are observing the process 
from outside. This is again something that our approach shares with 
that of many scientific naturalists, though I want to point towards an 
aspect more specific of the contractarian view: the assumption that an 
explicit or implicit agreement between the members of a scientific 
discipline is the only legitimate way of ‘aggregating’ the epistemic 
preferences of all these individual scientists. Nevertheless, it is true that 




other agents outside the research field or even outside science may have 
an interest in negotiating the norms according to which the game of 
research is played, and the study of this interaction can also be an 
interesting point of contact between the approach defended here and 
other approaches in the field of social epistemology. 
 
 
4. Do Researchers Obey the Norms? And Why? 
 
The past section has been devoted to show why recognition-seeking 
researchers are interested in establishing a set of methodological norms 
and what are the fundamental types and properties of these norms. But 
it is legitimate to ask still a further question, which is whether a scientist 
basically motivated by the attainment of public recognition will have an 
interest in obeying the rules he has approved. We must take into account 
that, both in the case of science and in other norm-regulated activities, 
individuals benefit from the fact that other people comply with the rules, 
but it can be very costly for oneself to behave accordingly. For example, 
my paying taxes is not advantageous for me (rather on the contrary!), 
but my life is much better because people pay taxes regularly. This is 
obviously the reason why such an impressive amount of resources are 
spent just in making people comply with the norms.  
Curiously enough, we do not observe something like an 
institutionalised ‘science police’ or ‘science tribunals’: scientific research 
seems to be ‘self-policing’, or at least more ‘self-policing’ than other 
kinds of practices. It is true that a large amount of case studies in 
history and sociology of science have been devoted to showing that 
scientists are far from being mechanical and systematic in their 
application of methodological norms, and that they tend to use the 
existing rules ‘strategically’ or ‘rhetorically’ (Pera and Shea 1991). But I 
do not think that this may serve to prove that scientific research is not 
regulated by those norms. In the first place, the vision of scientific 
method suggested here is not that of a logico-mathematical algorithm: 
actual methodological rules are usually ambiguous in their application 
to concrete cases, and they are frequently contradictory in their 
practical suggestions. So, it is natural that each scientist tries to 
interpret each norm in the way which is most favourable to his own 
theory. In the second place, usually not all methodological rules are 
violated simultaneously by a researcher; rather on the contrary, she 
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must employ some rules in order to justify why she has broken others; 
otherwise, her colleagues will simply not take into account what the 
former scientist is asserting. In the third place, and more importantly, a 
‘rhetorical’ use of a norm only makes sense if one expects that others are 
going to be persuaded by such a move: if everybody employed ‘just 
rhetorically’ the norms every time, no one would have a reason to do it. 
Appealing successfully to rhetorical strategies shows that your audience 
act according to some predictable patterns (at least within certain limits), 
and these regular patterns of decision making are just the real 
methodological norms we are referring to. 
The main reason why these patterns are chosen and followed is 
probably because of the nature of the reward pursued by scientists, i.e., 
recognition. Since what you want is that others express a public 
approbation of your own work, you do not obtain anything directly 
from your own decision about what facts or theories to accept; it only 
matters to you what facts or theories are accepted by your colleagues. So, 
the only question relevant for you is whether your colleagues obey the 
rules or not: if they do it, you will be rewarded for doing ‘good research’ 
(‘good’ according to the accepted norms), and you will get nothing 
otherwise; if they do not obey the rules, you will get nothing no matter 
what you do, because they are not going to accept your own theory 
however much effort you might put in defending it. So, the game of 
persuasion has two possible equilibria in general: either no one obeys the 
rules of the game (and this means that no research is done, save perhaps 
by isolated people), or everybody does (though, in this case, further 
problems arise when deciding which norms to institute). Under the 
contractarian vision of scientific method I am defending here, the first of 
these two equilibria would represent something like the ‘state of nature’, 
or, to express it in popular Kuhnian terms, perhaps the state of scientific 
disciplines in their ‘pre-paradigmatic period’. The emergence of a 
‘paradigm’, as well as its subsequent changes, can then be seen as the 
outcomes of collective negotiations on a ‘methodological contract’.3 
Unfortunately, the argument of the preceding paragraph does not 
entirely solve the problem stated in this section, for it only works 
properly with inferential and observational norms, i.e., the rules 
governing what propositions have to be accepted. Distributional norms, 
instead, open the possibility of enjoying other types of benefits (income, 
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travels, power, relief from boring activities, and so on), and people who 
have control over this kind of resources will surely be tempted to use 
them to their own advantage. It seems that, ‘under the veil of 
ignorance’, scientists will prefer that an institutional mechanism is 
established guaranteeing that a closer relation exists between the level of 
recognition one has reached and the resources and advantages that one 
can enjoy. Anyway, the design of such a self-enforcing, self-policing 
mechanism (if actual institutions are not satisfactory) is a difficult 
problem which offers a promising avenue of research for students of the 
economics of science. 
In conclusion, if we desired something like a ‘moral’ from this section, 
we could affirm that the norms for accepting facts, theories and laws 
prevailing in a scientific discipline are very probably ‘right’, in the sense 
that everybody trying to enter into the discipline to make a ‘critical 
examination’ of the knowledge produced by its members would conclude 
that those norms are acceptable, given all the available the information. 
On the contrary, the actual norms of distribution of resources within 
science will probably be more subject to criticism, in the sense that the 
interests of many people outside science may be strongly affected by the 
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